- (Arbitration) Notwithstanding a delegation clause, the question of whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate is a matter for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide. Jose Mario Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (No. H044372 Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 1-15 CV281073 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed March 1, 2022)
- (Settlement Agreements) Plaintiff was not excused from executing a more comprehensive settlement agreement subsequent to the parties’ executed settlement agreement. Helena Pappas v. Carolyn Chang (No. A159792 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Two Filed March 3, 2022 San Franscisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC18571679)
- (Evidence) Evidence Code Section 1291(a)(2) articulates a general rule in favor of introducing prior trial testimony, but against introducing prior deposition testimony. Raul Berroteran II v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles (Ford Motor Company) (No. S259522 Second Appellate District, Division One B296639 Los Angeles County Superior Court BC542525 March 7, 2022)
- (Arbitration) Defendant could not compel arbitration since the elderly resident’s conduct never manifested an intent for his son to sign the arbitration agreement on his behalf. Kathryn L. Rogers v. Roseville SH, LLC (No. C089561 Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-00244899-CU-PO-GDS California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed March 4, 2022)
- (Malicious Prosecution) Mobilehome park’s malicious prosecution action prevailed because prosection action prevailed because no reasonable attorney would have imputed nefarious meaning to the park’s letter requesting financial information from resident applicant. LA Investment, LLC v. Richard Spix (No. B304734 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC544662 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Three Filed March 4, 2022)
- (Evidence) The trial court erred in excluding a police report as double hearsay because the party-opponent exception and the official records exception made each level of hearsay admissible. Jane IL Doe v. Brightstar Residential Incorporated (No. B304084 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC667499 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed March 10, 2022)
The above referenced court opinions have come to our attention during last month. Please find below a brief summary of these opinions for your consideration.
- (Arbitration) Notwithstanding a delegation clause, the question of whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate is a matter for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide. Jose Mario Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (No. H044372 Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 1-15 CV281073 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed March 1, 2022)
This matter involved a wage and hours class action where the appellate court was asked to consider whether an arbitration provision in an employee handbook, coupled with acknowledgment forms, created a legally binding agreement to arbitrate the claims presented. The trial court found that the parties did not enter into a binding agreement to arbitrate.
On appeal, the employer contended, based upon a clause in the arbitration policy that the question of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate was for the arbitrator, not a court, to decide. The appeals court concluded that it is the court’s decision to decide whether the parties had entered into a valid arbitrate and not the arbitrator. It also found that the parties had not entered int an express or implied contract to arbitrate their disputes.
- (Settlement Agreements) Plaintiff was not excused from executing a more comprehensive settlement agreement subsequent to the parties’ executed settlement agreement. Helena Pappas v. Carolyn Chang (No. A159792 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Two Filed March 3, 2022 San Franscisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC18571679)
This matter arose out of a settlement of a medical malpractice claim made between the plaintiff/patient and the physician and the aftermath of a settlement of that claim. The settlement was made following a mediation where both parties were represented by counsel. Both parties and their counsel signed a memorandum of settlement, one paragraph of which provided in part that plaintiff “will execute a release of all claims, including waiver of Civil Code [section] 1542, in a more comprehensive settlement agreement…; said release to include a provision for mutual confidentiality as to the facts of the underlying case, the terms and amount of this agreement.”
The parties thereafter communicated for may months as to the terms of the “more comprehensive settlement agreement” and “a provision for mutual confidentiality,” to no avail, during which plaintiff discharged her attorney and, representing herself, advised the defendant’s attorney that she would only comply with a provision for confidentiality if she received 5x the amount of the original settlement.
Still representing herself, plaintiff sued the defendant in a one-count complaint alleging breach of contract. She retained new counsel and the case proceeded to a short bench trial, at the conclusion of which the trial court issued a statement of decision finding against the plaintiff “because she has not signed a ‘more comprehensive settlement agreement’ and release which includes a provision for mutual confidentiality.”
Once again representing herself, the plaintiff appealed essentially arguing that she did not provide a confidentiality provision and, in any event, such provision was against public policy and illegal, in violation of two sections of the Business and Professions Code. The arguments were rejected by the trial court. The appeals court rejected them as well and affirmed the judgment. The appeals court found that the plaintiff was not excused from executing a more comprehensive settlement agreement containing a confidentiality provision. It reasoned that the plain language of the memorandum expressly required the parties to execute the subsequent agreement. The court noted that plaintiff’s sworn testimony confirmed that there was the express recitation of the parties’ settlement agreement. She was represented by counsel when she read and signed the agreement. Moreover, the plaintiff admitted at the bench trial that she understood and agreed that she would later sign a more comprehensive settlement agreement. Thus, the appellate court ruled that plaintiff failed to prove performance and her breach of contract claim failed.
- (Evidence) Evidence Code Section 1291(a)(2) articulates a general rule in favor of introducing prior trial testimony, but against introducing prior deposition testimony. Raul Berroteran II v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles (Ford Motor Company) (No. S259522 Second Appellate District, Division One B296639 Los Angeles County Superior Court BC542525 March 7, 2022)
Plaintiff was a member of a class action against defendant. The matter settled after the plaintiff opted out to pursue his own lawsuit. In the class action, out-of-state defendant employees had given videotape deposition testimony, some of which the plaintiff sought to introduce and present at his trial. Defendant relying on the interpretation of Evidence Code Section 1291(a)(2) moved to exclude the plaintiff’s proffered deposition testimony, which was granted. Defendant relied on Wahlgren v. Coleco Industries, Inc., which concluded that Section 1291(a)(2)’s hearsay exception is generally inapplicable to testimony arising from a discovery deposition. Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to issue a new order denying the defendant’s motion. The Court of Appeal granted the petition, viewing the above evidence code section as reflecting no general rule against the introduction of prior deposition testimony.
The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed the decision of The Court of Appeal. Section 1291 (a)(2) permits the use of prior testimony in a proceeding only if the party seeking to exclude the testimony has the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive like that which the same party will have at the present hearing. The Legislature’s official comment provides that “if a series of cases arises involving several plaintiffs but one defendant, Section 1291 permits testimony given in the first trial to be used against the defendant in a later trial if the conditions of admissibility stated in the section are met.”
Here, the California Supreme Court viewed the Wahlgren case as construing Section 1291(a)(2) to articulate a general rule against the use of a discovery deposition in a subsequent proceeding, unless the proponent can show that the requirements of the statute are met. The Legislature’s comment distinguishes and highlights the different functions of trial and deposition testimony and recognizes, in effect, a general rule in favor of introducing prior trial testimony. However, the comment creates no such clear path regarding prior deposition testimony. The California Supreme found that the Court of Appeal disregarded the Legislature’s official comment concerning Section 1291. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.
- (Arbitration) Defendant could not compel arbitration since the elderly resident’s conduct never manifested an intent for his son to sign the arbitration agreement on his behalf. Kathryn L. Rogers v. Roseville SH, LLC (No. C089561 Super. Ct. No. 34-2018-00244899-CU-PO-GDS California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed March 4, 2022)
Plaintiff’s decedent was a resident of defendant’s nursing home and allegedly suffered negligent care by the defendant. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for elder abuse, fraud, and wrongful death. The defendant filed a petition to compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the Residency Agreement that the plaintiffs signed on their decedent’s behalf. The plaintiff never spoke to any defendant representatives about the Residency Agreement and decedent never indicated that the plaintiff had authority to sign for him. The trial court denied the defendant’s petition because it failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff had the authority to sign the arbitration on behalf of patient decedent’s behalf.
The defendant appealed contending that the plaintiff acted as the decedent patient’s actual or ostensible agent when he signed the arbitration agreement.
The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It found that the Residency Agreement never expressly stated that the plaintiff was authorized to sign as the decedent patient’s agent. Moreover, defendant’s reliance on the plaintiff’s conduct alone to indicate an agency relationship was unpersuasive since the decedent patient’s actions as the principal determined the existence of such a relationship. Finally, the defendant argued that the decedent patient ratified the arbitration agreement by refusing to rescind it within the 30-day window under the Residency Agreement and because there was evidence that the decedent patient knew plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement on his behalf.
- (Malicious Prosecution) Mobilehome park’s malicious prosecution action prevailed because prosection action prevailed because no reasonable attorney would have imputed nefarious meaning to the park’s letter requesting financial information from resident applicant. LA Investment, LLC v. Richard Spix (No. B304734 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC544662 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Three Filed March 4, 2022)
This matter involved the sale of a mobilehome between two parties. The mobilehome was at a mobile park owned by the plaintiff and the purchaser applied for residency at the park in connection with the sale. The plaintiff mobile home park owner’s attorney sent a letter to the purchaser asking for additional information in support of her application for her residency, which requested a schedule of real estate owned, mortgage statements, income and expense detail, and verification of funds to complete the purchase. The purchaser did not respond to the letter and cancelled the mobilehome purchase. Subsequently, the seller of the mobile home and her attorney filed suit against the plaintiff asserting, among other things, that the mobilehome park owner interfered with the contract to sell the mobilehome by unreasonably refusing to approve the application. The trial court determined that the seller’s attorney had no probable cause to initiate the lawsuit. Thereafter, the mobile home park owner filed a malicious prosection action against the attorney representing the seller. The attorney argued he had probable cause to initiate the action because he believed that the letter from the mobile home park’s owner attorney was intrusive and requested more information than was permitted. The attorney for the seller also testified that, at the time the sale fell through, he was aware that the mobilehome residency laws permitted inquiry concerning the ability of a prospective tenant to pay rent. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff mobile home park owner and the attorney appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. It found that the letter from the mobile home park owner requesting items constituting documentation as to the amount and source of mobilehome seller income or means of financial support appropriate. They further held that no reasonable attorney would have imputed nefarious meaning to the attorney letter because there was nothing overreaching about the letter. Therefore, the appeals court found no probable cause to initiate the underlying action. The court noted that in a claim for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove the prior action was brought without probable cause, meaning its claims were not legally tenable, and that a reasonable attorney would conclude the underlying action was totally and completely without merit.
- (Evidence) The trial court erred in excluding a police report as double hearsay because the party-opponent exception and the official records exception made each level of hearsay admissible. Jane IL Doe v. Brightstar Residential Incorporated (No. B304084 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC667499 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed March 10, 2022)
Plaintiff a mentally disabled child, sued defendant residential care facility after the defendant’s handyman sexually assaulted her. Plaintiff’s lawsuit was based upon a claim that the defendant and its owners failed to protect her. Defendant moved for summary judgment. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff offered a police file showing that defendant knew its handyman had a history of harassing women. The report stated that shortly after the assault, one of the defendant owners told police officers that he knew the handyman had a history of loitering around the facility and harassing female employees. The trial court excluded the police file as inadmissible hearsay, noting that police reports are usually never admissible, and granted the motion for summary judgment because the attack was unforeseeable.
The appeals court reversed and remanded the matter. The appeals court held that the police report contained multiple levels of hearsay that was still admissible, because each level of hearsay was admissible under a hearsay exception. At one level, the defendant owner’s statement to the officer was an admission of a party opponent. In addition, the police officer’s report was admissible as an official record. The court noted that the defendant contested neither the authenticity of the police report not the foundational requirements of the official records exception. Rather, it argued that the exception did not reach each witness statement in the report. Accordingly, the trial court erred in excluding admissible evidence relevant to show that defendant knew its handyman was a danger to the plaintiff.
Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.